CALIFORNIANS NEED BEACHES-MAYBE
YOURS!
The shoreline of the United States will always be "ouredge, our
continental definition. As such it has significance for every
American. We each have a right to our individual odyssey on
a stretch of sand, to look outward and to look inward as a
nation and as man, inspired by the sea lapped shore.'
A.

INTRODUCTION

Our nation faces a serious problem of congested recreational
2
resources as a result of a rapid increase in population
compounded by concomitant increases in urbanization and leisure
time.3 These factors simultaneously increase the demand for more
public recreational areas and reduce the amount of space
available. Necessarily, this expanding demand comes into conflict
with the private property rights of those who hold title to lands
particularly suited for public recreational purposes. A recently
litigated aspect of this conflict involves the ownership of the beach
areas of our nation's sea coasts. Public interest demands public
use, access, and enjoyment; traditional property concepts permit
title to the vast majority of beaches to be privately held.'
Americans by the millions are accoutred with sunglasses,
bathing suits, clam rakes, bird guides, and leisure time for their
odyssey by the sea, but in a crowded age the shore itself is
becoming preempted by uses which outlaw its public recreation
and re-creation possibility.'
It will be the purpose of this note to examine the effectiveness of
some current judicial and legislative attempts to resolve this
conflict. In addition, possible alternative approaches, in
accordance with general public policy, will be suggested.
Public use of the seashore has been encouraged, as a matter
I. Udall, Forewardto H. GILLIAM, ISLAND IN TIME at 7 (1962). (A Sierra Club
publication).
2. At present the world population has a doubling time of only 35 years. P. EHRLICH,
THE POPULATION BOMB 18 (12th ed. 1968).
3. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, LIFETIME ALLOCATION OF
WORK AND LEISURE 22 (1968) in which it is estimated that the employed worker has about
1,200 hours per year more leisure time than did his 1890 counterpart.
4. Udall, Forewardto H. GILLIAM, ISLAND IN TIME at 7 (1962).
5. See note 7 infra.
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of public policy, from the nation's earliest history.' At one time,

the nation's seashores must have seemed more than ample to meet
the recreational needs of a future populace, since much of the

nation's seacoast was converted to private ownership by states
anxious for development and reclamation. Now, the public
beaches are rapidly becoming congested and are no longer
adequate to meet public needs.8

Although legislatures and courts are aware of this problem,
they are confronted by the dilemma inherent in honoring private
rights obtained through valid state conveyances while at the same
time meeting a burgeoning public need. State constitutional
provisions apparently requiring access9 are not being enforced and

the power of eminent domain 0 is not being utilized by the states

to place the beaches in public ownership. Therefore, the judiciary
has been left to implement public policy in a case by case struggle

"in the face of a clamoring national need."'" Some courts,
demonstrating a willingness to go beyond their traditional
applications of property law, have been able to find that the public

does in fact have an established right to the access and use of what
have been formerly considered strictly "private" beaches. Some

of the doctrines which have been relied on to find these public
rights are custom, prescription, and dedication. 2
Before embarking upon a general discussion of these judicial
solutions, it becomes necessary to more accurately define the

physical area in controversy. In common parlance, the word
6. See, e.g., Jackvony v..Powel, 21 A.2d 554, 558 (1941) for a discussion of an early
state constitutional provision protecting the "common law rights of the people" in the
shore.
7. "Only two percent of our extraordinary coastline, the Atlantic, the Gulf Stream,
and the Pacific . . . is devoted to public use." Address by John F. Kennedy, Great Falls,

Montana, Sept. 26, 1963, in

AMERICA THE BEAUTIFUL

28 (R. Polley ed. 1964).

8. Acutely demonstrated, for example, by visualizing the 200,000 people who crowd
the six miles of Jones Beach each summer's day. Udall, Forwardto H. GILLIAM, ISLAND
IN TIME at 7 (1962).
9. CAL. CONST. art. XV, § 2 provides that no private property owner shall be
permitted to exclude the right of way to navigable waters whenever it is required for a
public purpose. Recreation has been termed a public purpose. This provision, however,
may be violative of the 5th Amendment. See note 10, infra.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. See CAL. CONST. art. 1,§ 14 for a similar state
provision. The extremely high cost of acquiring beach property through eminent domain
proceedings is prohibitive.
11. Forewardto H. GILLIAM, supra note 8.
12. See text accompanying notes 30, 35, 55 infra.
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"beach" refers to that portion of littoral land which consists
primarily of sand and pebbles washed upon the land by the action
of the sea.1 3 By this descriptive definition then, "beach" includes
all of the land from the water's edge inland to the beginning of
vegetation or to an artificial border. Legally, however, the beach
is divided between 1) the foreshore, or wet-sand area, which
extends from the water to the mean high tide line, and 2) the
remaining area of dry-sand, which has the mean high-tide line as
its seaward boundary.
With few exceptions, and as a generally accepted doctrine,
ownership of the foreshore is in the state, as public land, and is
held in trust for the people." Unfortunately, the foreshore, or wetsand area, is limited in its use for many water-related activities.
The center of controversy is the remaining portion of the "beach"
which is not subject to a public trust and which has been granted
to private interests. The dry-sand area has as its principle value
its usefulness as a recreational adjunct to the wet-sand and water.
The question is whether the public has the right to use the drysand area over the objections of the title holder.
B.

THE CALIFORNIA APPROACH: DEDICATION

Congestion resulting from overpopulation in combination
with increased leisure time is acutely evident in the nation's
"Golden State." In addition to its notoriously idyllic climate,
California is one of the most industrial states in the nation and
is the most urbanized.1 5 The total state population, already the
largest in the country, is also one of the fastest growing at the rate
of 900 residents per day. 6 Furthermore, the vast majority of both
17
population and industrial organization is located on the coasts.
Notwithstanding the residential, business, and industrial
congestion, the coasts, or more specifically, the beach areas, are
a focal point for recreational activities. It is estimated that in 1969
the amount of "people days" spent on just the beaches in Orange
13. Borden v. Town of Westport, 151 A. 512, 515, 112 Conn. 152 (1930).
14. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.27 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
15. See, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 1969 CALIFORNIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT Los
Angeles-Long Beach, for example, ranks as the 3rd largest metropolitan area in the
United States; San Francisco-Oakland is ranked 6th.
16. Id.
17. 1 CALIFORNIA ADVISORY COMM'N ON MARINE AND COASTAL RESOURCES,
DEFINING THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 25 (1969).
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County alone was two and a half times greater than the days spent
at all of the state's 4.2 million acres of national parks.,'
Everything and everybody crowds to the coastline in California
and wants all other activities there suppressed . . . .The
natural beauties of the. . . coastline are gnawed away into the
insatiable maw of civilization and commerce. Because many of
the changes, if not most, are irreversible, permanent damage
is done which cannot be repaired.
A horrifying portent of the future is the estimate that "in
1980 the crowds at Los Angeles' 34 miles of beaches alone will
almost equal the number of people who used the entire coastline
last year." 2 Hardly consoling, then, is the fact that the public is
possessed of the "wet-sand" area of the entire length of the state's
coast, since a fence to the mean high tide line can effectively
prevent access much of the time, and public rights in the wet sand
area are of little benefit or use without reasonable access. The
1,05121 miles of coast cannot be lengthened to accomodate for
such increased use. Even more distressing is the fact that only 40
percent of the length of the coast is publicly owned-a mere 89
miles of which are classified as sandy-swimming beaches. 2
Privately owned sandy beaches are often fenced off to prevent
public access to the wet sand and water. But, public policy, as
expressed by the State Constitution and as recently reaffirmed by
the State Supreme Court seems quite clear on this point.2 Article
XV, § 2, provides that no one shall be permitted to exclude the
right of way to the water whenever it is required for any public
purpose. In explicit language, it seems to require public access to
the wet-sand. Fencing off the dry-sand, a reasonable route of
18. Address by Assemblyman Sieroty, San Clemente, Calif., Jan. 1970, in L.A.

Times, It's Time to Stop Drilling Off the Coast, Feb. 1, 1970 at § D, p. 1,col. 1.
19. 1 CALIFORNIA ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 17.
20. Address by Assemblyman Sieroty, supra note 18.
21. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION, CALIF.
SYSTEM PLAN in which the following statistics are pointed out:
A. Total coast miles-l,051.43 (Publicly owned-425.17 or 40%).
B. Public ownership by shoreline type:
1. Sandy swimming beaches-50% of the 179 mile total.
2. Sandy-non swimming beaches-42%.
3. Pebble beaches-27%.

STATE PARK

4. Rocky Shore, headlands, and cliffs-35%.
22. Id.
23. CAL. CONsT. art XV § 2; Gion v. The City of Santa Cruz, 2 C.3d 29, 465 P.2d
50,84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970).
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access, would thus seem to exclude the right of way to the public
and therefore violate the State Constitution.
The constitutionality of a similar provision has been
questioned and remains a matter of conjecture since this issue has
not yet been litigated. 24 It is possible that a constitutional
guarantee of public access through private property would be
considered a "taking" and therefore, under the Fifth Amendment,
require compensation. However, the use of a doctrine such as
dedication, by virtue of which the court may determine that the
public has previously acquired rights in the property, avoids a
conclusion of "taking" and bypasses the possible constitutional
issue. As the available beaches become more crowded, the
probability of utilizing Article XV, § 2, as a basis to find public
rights of access through private beach property increases almost
to the point of certainty. At some future time, its constitutionality
will be an issue which must be decided. One possible conclusion
may be a finding that it is constitutional to provide that certain
rights of the public are to be considered paramount to private
property rights of littoral owners and that these rights may exist
concurrently.
The strong public policy expressed in the State Constitution,
Article XV, § 2, is reflected in other legislative enactments. 5 The
policy of encouraging public use of shoreline areas is not unique
to California as a state particularly suited by climate, populace,
and geography to recreation-orientation, but can also be found
expressed in other coastal states.2 The seashores of this nation are
generally regarded, at least verbally, as a valuable part of the
national heritage.
But on shore after shore

the barriers are going uphighways and houses, fences and signs,
Keeping people out, displacing wild things,
Blotting out a heritage.
24. See also, Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App.

1964).
25. Other enactments encouraging public use of shoreline areas are: CAL. Civ.
CODE § 830 (West 1954), CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 25, GOV. CODE §§ 54090-93, 39933-37
(West 1954), FISH AND GAME CODE.§ 6511 (West 1958); PUBLIC RESOURCES
CODE §§ 6008, 6210.4, and 6323 (West 1956).
26. See, e.g., "Open Beaches Bill", Acts 56th Leg. of Texas 1959, 2nd Called Session,
Ch. 19 at 108 (VERNON'S ANN. Civ. STAT. art. 5415d, § I et seq.) which creates a prima

facie presumption of private rights in beach areas.
27. Preface, H. GILLIAM, ISLAND INTIME (1962). (Hereinafter cited as GILLIAM).
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Unfortunately, words of policy have not been effective in
keeping our shores open to the public.
Once a strong public policy has been established, however,
the problem becomes one of implementation and application.
Since there are not enough public beaches to accomodate
California's rapidly growing, leisure-oriented society, how can the
State, through its courts and legislature, best act to improve, or
hopefully, to rectify the situation? The companion cases of Dietz
v. King and Gion v. City of Santa Cruz 2 illustrate a recent
judicial attempt to arrive at a solution. The facts of each case,
briefly stated, are as follows:
1.

Gion v. City of Santa Cruz

Gion owned property overlooking the ocean. Part of the land
was level and contiguous to a city owned road; the remainder
dropped off, cliff-like, onto a shelf area, and from there to the sea.
Since 1900, members of the public parked their vehicles on the
land near the road and freely used the property to "fish, swim,
picnic, and view the ocean" unrestrained by any "significant"
objection by the owners. Gion's grantor, who owned the property
for twenty years, had occasionally posted signs indicating private
ownership, but had never asked anyone to leave and freely gave
permission to anyone who asked to use the property. Prior to
1941, apparently no one exerted any proprietory interest in the
property at all. However, the city of Santa Cruz took a growing
interest in making the area safe for the public, beautifying it, and
improving it to facilitate public use. The court below held that the
Gions still had title to the property but that their title was subject
to an easement in the city, for itself and on behalf of the public,
for recreational purposes. The Supreme Court affirmed this
decision, upholding the easement on behalf of the public, in, on,
over and across said property for public recreation purposes, and
uses incidental thereto, including, but not limited to, parking,
fishing, picnicking, general viewing . . .
2.

Dietz v. King

Dietz brought a class suit on behalf of the public to enjoin
the private property owner, King, from blocking public use of a
28. 2 C.3rd 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970). (Hereinafter cited as GionDietz).
29. Id. at 35.
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dirt road leading to a beach. The road which crosses three
separate private properties, including King's which is the nearest
to the beach, is the only convenient access to the beach by land.
The public had used both beach and road for at least 100 years,
in ever increasing numbers, with no objections from previous
owners. King's grantors, in fact, testified that they actually
"encouraged the public to use the beach." King bought the
property for investment purposes in 1960 and a year later made
his first attempt to halt public use of the road. by placing a large
log across it. Beachgoers removed it two hours later. King posted
"No Trespassing" signs which were always removed by the time
he next visited the property. The public continued to use the beach
until 1966 when King finally sent in a caterpillar crew to
permanently blockade the road. A temporary restraining order
halted this attempt. The court below ruled in favor of King on the
basis that there was no dedication of the beach or road to the
public and that widespread public use does not lead to an implied
dedication. The court reversed this decision, holding that there
had been, as a matter of law, a common-law dedication of King's
property to the public. This decision is very important in that it
marks the first time the court has so willingly applied the doctrine
of dedication to beach areas.
Dedication, the donation of land by its owner for public use,
is not a new doctrine. 3 That property may be dedicated to the
public use and benefit is a well established principle of common
law, but it is only in recent times that dedication has assumed
much importance. In most jurisdictions, as in California,
dedication according to common law principles is possible
regardless of statutory dedication provisions. However, the
principles of common law dedication vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.
The history of California's application of dedication
principles is summarized in Union Transportation Co. v.

Sacramento County,31 the most recent discussion of implied
dedication prior to Gion-Dietz. In that case, the court found an
implied dedication of a private road to the public and defines a
30. Dedication: "An appropriation of land to some public use, made by the owner,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 500 (4th
ed. 1951).
31. 42 Cal. 2d 235, 267 P.2d 10 (1954). (Hereinafter cited as Union).

and accepted for use by or on behalf of the public."
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common-law dedication as: A voluntary transfer of an interest in
land . . . (which) partakes both the nature of a grant and a gift,
and is governed by the fundamental principles which control such
transactions. 2
The court points out that an offer by the owner, clearly and
unequivocally indicated by his words or acts, to dedicate the land
to public use and an acceptance by the public are essential to such
a dedication.? Cases also hold that an offer to dedicate land may
be inferred from the owner's long acquiescence in public use under
circumstances which negate the idea of license. 34 By analogy to
prescription, other cases hold that after the public has freely used
a road for more than five years, with the knowledge of the owner,
and without objections being made, then a conclusive presumption
of dedication to the public arises.3 1 If the dedication is by adverse
user, the court points out that it must be shown that the user was
adverse, continuous, and with the knowledge of the owner for the
required period of time.3 Whether the user is adverse is a question
of fact to be determined from the circumstances of each case.
The court cites Schwerdle v. County of Placer3 to illustrate
the distinction between dedication by acquiescence in public use
and dedication by adverse use. When a dedication is sought to be
established by a use for- a short period of time, then true consent
or acquiescence is essential since without it dedication will not be
presumed. Where actual consent and/or acquiescence in public use
can be proved, however, the length of the public use is immaterial
since the public rights immediately vest once there is an offer,
manifested by words or conduct, and an acceptance by public use.
On the other hand, when-the claim of the public rests upon
a long continued adverse use, the adverse use itself establishes a
conclusive presumption of consent and so of dedication. In this
case, knowledge and acquiescence are also conclusively presumed,
negating the idea of license. The court in Union states that
dedication by adverse use has been characterized as one implied
by law, while a dedication inferred from the acts of the owner or
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

County of Inyo v. Given, 183 Cal. 415, 418, 191 P. 688, 690 (1920).
42 Cal. 2d at 240, 267 P.2d at 13 (1954).
F.A. Hihn Co. v. City of Santa Cruz, 170 Cal. 436, 448, 150 P. 62 (1915).
Union, note 3 1, supra.
Id.
Schwerdtle v. County of Placer, 108 Cal. 589, 41 P. 448 (1895).
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from his acquiescence in public use may be termed a dedication
implied in fact."8
When litigants attempt to prove dedication by implication, a
myriad of problems arise. One of the problems involves the
determination of just what conduct will suffice to imply the
necessary intent. At common-law there can be no dedication
without intent either express or implied. In California, the intent
to dedicate may be implied from either the conduct or words of
the owner or, as in adverse use cases, from the conduct of the
public itself in the use of the land. Although previous decisions
have required a clear manifestation of intent for an implied
dedication, cases have also held that a dedication by implication
may arise when the necessary intent is implied by law from acts
which may not directly manifest any intent.
As stated in Gion-Dietz, implied dedication in California can
be proven by showing either acquiescence by the. owner in public
use under circumstances which negate the idea of license or by
open and continuous use for five years. If either of the above
criteria is met, then as a matter of law the owner has dedicated
his property to the public benefit and welfare.
Dietz and Gion were decided together because both raised the
issue of how to determine when an implied dedication has been
made. The court points out that both contain evidence in support
of the "acquiescence" theory, but since that point was not argued
the court would restrict its consideration to the other means of
establishing implied dedication-adverse user. Under the first
theory, the owner's intent, as implied from his acquiescence in the
public's use of his property, is a crucial factor. In showing
dedication by adverse use, however, the intent and activities of the
public, rather than the owner, are the critical factors and are what
the court will examine. The court must determine whether or not
the public has engaged in sufficient adverse use to raise the
conclusive presumption of knowledge and acquiescence, and to
negate the idea of license.
Under the Gion-Dietz holding, the degree of adverse use
sufficient to raise this presumption still remains somewhat vague.
Presenting a modus operandi for future litigants, the court states
that they must show that various groups used the property in the
38. 42 Cal. 2d at 241,267 P.2d at 13 (1954).
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belief that the public had such a right, i.e. without objection or
interference from the owner, and that they used it in this manner
for more than five years. It is clear that this use need not be
"adverse" to the property owner in the same sense that it would
have to be in an "adverse possession" or "prescription" case and
that a separate finding of adversity is not necessary. In view of
the fact that-the court points out in Union Transportation Co. v.

Sacramento County that "it must be shown that the user wds
adverse"39 and that whether or not it is adverse is a question of
fact, the court in Gion-Dietz indicates a slightly altered view of
the nature of adversity in dedication cases. The court, rather
summarily, arrives at the conclusion that public use, unhindered,
and continuous for five years will be deemed "adverse."" Since
it may result in dedication, this use certainly is adverse to the
owner's private property interests in the truest, if not the
traditional sense of the word.
The law at one time presumed that public use was under
license by the owner, which had the effect of negating an adverse
use. Therefore, the public had the difficult burden of proving the
absence of license. The court rejected this presumption in
O'Banion v. Borba,41 shifting the burden of proof to the owner
who must affirmatively prove either license or significant attempts
to prevent public use. Unless one of these is proved to the
satisfaction of the trier of fact, the owner will find, regardless of
actual intent, that the land is no longer his to do with as he
wishes.
Questions raised or left open in the instant cases will no
doubt form the basis for much future litigation. For example, the
question of what attempts will be considered adequate to halt
public use becomes basic. In Dietz, King made many
"reasonable" attempts, he thought, to prevent public use of his
property. The court states that whether or not the owner's efforts
are adequate will depend upon the means used in relation to the
property and upon the extent of the public use. The court points
out that King's attempts were not adequate since the huge crowds
of beach goers were not dissuaded by the "No trespassing" signs
39. Diamond Match Co. v. Savercool, 218 Cal. 665, 669, 24 P.2d 783, 784 (1933).
40. For a similar treatment of adversity, see Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375
S.W.2d at 937, 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
41. 32 Cal.2d 145,149-50, 195 P.2d 10 (1948).
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or by the logs placed in the road. It is interesting .to note that at
one time, when fewer people used the beach, such attempts might
have been adequate but when King, in the face of ever growing
hordes of people with campers and trailers, finally attempted to
do an effective job of blockading the road, he was enjoined. The
question is one of fact to be determined from the circumstances
of each case, but the court makes it clear that the owner must
prove that he has made more than "minimal" and "ineffectual"
efforts in order to even raise the issue.
The question of use under license is also one of fact. The
owner faces the problem of how to grant the public a license to
use his property. He must choose between attempting to prevent
public use by "adequate" means or by giving the public license
or permission to use his property in order to prevent adverse use.
Giving permission to some of the beach users does not extend the
license to all. Since it appears impossible to give each member of
the public a personal license, the problem of granting a general
license to the public rests upon the owner.
Another question not fully discussed in the opinion is what
property rights remain to a private owner after his property has
been found dedicated to the public. The common law provided
that full title to the fee passed in the event of a dedication. In the
instant cases, the court states that full title, as in Gion, need not
necessarily pass just because it has in the past.4 2 Evidently, the
public obtains the right of use while the fee owner relinquishes
exclusive possession.
The status o f current beach property owners is uncertain.
Their property may have already been dedicated by previous
owners. If not, what attempts to halt public use will be deemed
adequate becomes an important question. Whether or not the
activities of Dietz or Gion's predessessors in title were
"adequate" attempts to halt the influx of beachgoers to their
properties was not determinitive of the outcome, since:
Previous owners, . . . by ignoring the wide spread use of the
land for more than five years have impliedly dedicated the
property to the public. Nothing can be done by the present
owners to take back that which was previously given away."
42. Gion-Dietz at 44, n.3.
43. Id.
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This language raises one of the most crucial questions left
unanswered by this decision. Is 'this applicable to any five year
period of time?
While generating doubt and uneasiness in the minds of
"private" beach owners, the court simultaneously offers
encouragement to those concerned over the diminuation of
available recreational resources to a rapidly growing populace.
How this finding actually affects public use of the beaches and its
effectiveness in implementing the State public policy encouraging
such use will be discussed below.
Gion-Dietz offers the people of California a guarantee that
all of the beach areas and accesses which have been in public use
for more than five years can now be kept public, regardless of the
fee owner's current or future attempts to prevent such use. The
State, through its Department of Justice, has promised to aid in
enforcing this guarantee. The Attorney General's office is
preparing similar cases "to insure public access to other coastal
areas in California."44 Just how many seashore miles this decision
could affect is unknown.
No survey has been taken of what portion of this shoreline
(privately owned) has been used for beach access by the public
over a period of five years. 5
Of the approximately 625 miles 8 of private beach, the 89
miles of private sandy-swimming beaches probably have been the
most in public use. The public has no doubt also acquired rights
in some of the 54047 miles of private beach unsuitable for
swimming but suitable for picnicking, camping, fishing, and other
water related activities. The court does not limit its application of
implied dedication to any particular geographic area such as "dry
sand" nor does it designate only existing roads as means of
ingress and egress, but simply uses the term "beach area." This
undefined phrase could conceivably apply to any publicly used
land which is close to a beach or connected with beach use. The
decision in this context offers a means of preserving the status
quo.
44. Fradkin, State Promises Aid in Enforcing Public Access to Beaches, L.A. Times,
Feb. 25, 1970, § A, P.3, col. 3.

45. Id.
46. See note 21 supra.

47. Id.
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The court has difficulty in explaining its former reluctance to
apply the principles of dedication to beach areas. It states that the
doctrine has been readily applied to find implied dedication of
roads, parks, and other "well-defined" areas and that the court
has previously preferred to use the doctrine in cases involving a
"well-defined" property. For that reason, the court points out,
"most of the case law involving dedication in this state has
concerned roads and land bordering roads." 4 The court's
explanation for this former reluctance is that roads are easily
defined, frequently needed through private property, and are also
frequently the subject of express dedications.
This reasoning seems specious since it is strongly arguable
that beach areas are not "open" in the sense of being undefined,
but are as well defined as a road in area, since they are bordered
on one side by the mean high tide line and on the inland side by
the vegetation line. 9 At any rate, the court reached the conclusion
that now the "rules governing implied dedication apply with equal
force . . . to land used by the public for purposes other than as

a roadway." 5 The growing public need for beaches,
intensification of land use, and "clear public policy in favor of
encouraging and expanding public access to and use of shoreline
areas ' 51 are the reasons the court gives for its new willingness to
apply the arguments of implied dedication to open beach areas.
As conditions change, so must the traditional application of
established doctrines.
The first application of this landmark decision occurred
recently in Northern California. San Mateo County brought suit
against the heirs of an estate claiming that eleven acres of
privately-owned beach had become public by virtue of
unhampered use by the public for a five year period. In finding
for the county, the court not only ruled that the public had
acquired the eleven acres as public beach but had also acquired
an additional few acres as a recreational easement to the beach
because "the public, without restriction, had used the easement
for five years or more." 5 The court honored the Gion-Dietz
48. Gion-Dielz at 41.

49. 375 S.W. 2d 923 contains a good discussion of defining the beaches as a definite
area.
50. See note 48 supra.
51. Id.
52. L.A. Times, April 1, 1970, § 1, at 32, col. 3.
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guarantee that the public shall continue to use what it has been
using provided that the public and its agents are vigilant (as they
apparently are in view of this litigation) and do not permit private
interests to encroach upon public rights.
In Gion-Dietz the court notes a recent Oregon Supreme
Court decision "for a similar result. ' 53 Eventually, the results in
each state will no doubt coincide since the aims of each court as
expressed in their opinions are the same. The Oregon decision,
however, has certain advantages not found in the California
approach. An illustration of how another state, after
contemplating the same problems, facts, and public policy, arrived
at a "similar result" through the application of a rather unique
doctrine may serve to demonstrate the variety of possible judicial
solutions and approaches available.
C.

THE OREGON APPROACH: CUSTOM
Hay 54 involved an action brought by

Thorton v.
the state to
enjoin the defendant tourist facility from constructing fences and
making improvements in the dry-sand area to which they held
title. The lower court found that the public had acquired a right
of use in the dry-sand by both implied-dedication and
prescription. Consequently, it granted an injunction. On appeal,
the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's holding but
disagreed with its legal basis for conclusion. Because of the sui
generis nature of the land and the great value of the right to its
use, the trial court should not have to rely on the traditional
theories which have produced complex and overlapping precedent.
Specifically criticizing dedication, it stated that whether implied
or express the doctrine requires an intent to dedicate, and, too
often the requirement is tenuously satisfied. Prescription is
disfavored because it can only be applied to a specific tract of land
and as such requireg repeated litigation of substantially the same
issue.
To obviate the need to employ these traditional theories and
yet find a right acquired by the public, the court adopted the
English Doctrine of Custom. A custom is defined as "such usage
53. Stateexrel. Thorton v. Hay, 89 Adv. Ore. Rpts. 897, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).

54. Id.
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as by common consent and uniform practice has become the law
of the place, or of the subject matter, to which it relates." 55
In order to justify the adoption of the doctrine, the court had
to considerably expand the traditional geogralihical limitations
put upon its use. The doctrine had its roots and principle
application in feudal England, and most case reference to
customary rights has been local in scope.-6 Furthermore, many
American jurisdictions have rejected the doctrine on the theory
that the antiquity requirement could not be satisfied in such a new
country. 7 However, the court rather convincingly overcomes thi.,
argument by stating:
It is true that the Anglo-American legal system on this
continent is relatively new. Its newness has made it possible for
government to provide for many of our institutidns by written
law rather than by customary law. This truism does not,
however, militate against the validity of a custom when the
custom does in fact exist. If antiquity were the sole test of
validity of custom, Oregonians could satisfy that requirement
by recalling that the European settlers were not the first people
to use the dry sand as public land. 8
It would seem that if we accept the court's argument in this
regard, the fact that the doctrine has not before been applied to
include such expansive geographic regions should not stand as a
sole stumbling block to the doctrine's application. 9
Transportation and communication in the United States is such
that most people traverse the expanses of their state as freely as
did the feudal inhabitants their villages. In essence, what is local
is relative to the extent the populace makes use of its physical
surroundings.
If we assume that the court has successfully justified a new
use of the old doctrine we must consider whether or not the public
use has been such as to satisfy the basic requirements for its
application. Although the court treats each of the requirements
individually, essentially all are met by the assertion that the public
has used the dry-sand in Oregon since the beginning of the state's
55. 1 Bouv. LAw
56.
57.
58.
59.

DICTIONARY

742 (Rawle's Third Rev.).

R. POVELL, REAL PROPERTY § 934 (1949).
J. GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 585 (1942).
89 Adv. Ore. Rpts. 900,901,462 P.2d 667, 668 (1969).
Id.
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political history. The court refers to Shively v. Bowlby 0 which
affirmed that the land under tide waters had its title and control
in the hands of the sovereign and is held in trust for the people,
that any rights acquired in it by individuals were subordinate to
the public use. Those lands specifically referred to were those
which were incapable of cultivation or improvement as opposed
to those above the high water mark-where vegetation is possible.
The public did, then, have a recognized right as benficiaries of the
public trust in all of the sand up to the vegetation line. It was not
until 1935 when the Supreme Court in Borax Consolidated Ltd.
v. Los Angeles" redefined the term "high water mark" that the
public's right in the beach was virtually confined to the wet-sand
area.
Regardless of whether or not the court in Borax was justified
in limiting the public trust, the public had none-the-less effectively
used the entire beach under a claim of right from our nation's
earliest beginning until 1935. It would seem that this fact alone
would suffice to meet the requirements necessary to make the use
a custom which would have the protection of law. As such, the
littoral owner's title boundaries, although expanded by Borax are
still subject to the public right of use in the dry-sand portion.
Recognition of this continued right raises the question of
whether or not the private improvements made in the dry-sand
area have been made without license, and if so, what recourse does
the public have. Although this seems to be a problem with which
the Oregon court and those which follow it must eventually face,
further consideration of it at this juncture must be deferred.
The practical value of accepting the doctrine and its
application is that it makes it possible to treat all of the state
beach property with uniformity. Regardless of whether or not the
public is able to prove the specific requirements for prescription
or dedication, the right to use all of the state's dry-sand area for
recreational purposes is recognized.
Assuming that the Oregon judiciary was justified in applying
the doctrine of custom and recognizing the expediency of its use,
it may be well for California to use the same approach.
60. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
61. 296 U.S. 10 (1935). The Court defined "ordinary high water" as the "mean high

water" determined by a period of tidal observation.
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Obviously, to successfully do so, its judiciary would have to
demonstrate that California's history of beach use is similar to
that of Oregon's as presented in the Hay case. It would seem that
one could assume that prior to achieving statehood their histories
of beach use would be similar. The difficulty, however, would lie
in demonstrating a similar public usage since achieving statehood
even though their property law and application of the public trust
2
somewhat differ.6
D.

THE DOCTRINES: DEDICATION V. CUSTOM

Ideally, a resolution of the conflict between public and
private interests should be not only an implementation of public
policy but also equitable and expedient. Both of the recent judicial
approaches discussed above support public policy encouraging
public use of beaches. The doctrines diverge, however, in the realm
of expediency.
Dedication is too time consuming to be of immediate value
in relieving congestion. It doesn't open up new areas, but
maintains what is already in public use. Considering congested
court calendars, tract by tract litigation could keep the courts
busy for years. Furthermore, this doctrine is not an affirmative
direct approach in that it puts the onus on the people to prove
their right to use rather than recognizing that the public's right
to use exists.13 However, dedication, as applied by California, has
the virtue of flexibility in that it can take place in a relatively short
period of time and be applied to any land in dispute.
The Oregon court, in declaring the right of the people to use
the beaches of the state, from the northern to southern borders,
has acted expediently. In a single finding of custom, the court
enabled itself to recognize the public's right to use all of the state's
beaches inland to the vegetation line. The decision is clear and the
doctrine eliminates any previous uncertainty over who had a right
62. For a discussion of the public trust in California see Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law-Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv.

473, 524 (1970).
63. Assuming that the public, at some period in the history of the state, has used all
of the seashore areas possibly amienable to public use, it follows that the decision could
conceivably be used as a springboard for acquiring all privately owned, but publicly usable,

beach in the State. This resultant expansion of seashore recreation areas is what is so
urgently needed, not just preservation of the status-quo.
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to the dry-sand area. Yet, custom is limited to just those lands
used by the public from "time immemorial."
Custom and dedication are both deemed equitable by the
courts since neither doctrine theoretically takes away any rights a
private property owner would have reason to believe he had, or
that he in fact did have. In practice how'ever, a private property
owner would have good reason to believe that what he bought was
his, if unaware of any previous dedication, he purchased in
reliance on his grantor's belief that the full incidents of ownership
were being conveyed. This might be particularly true in seasonal
areas where there would be a lack of actual notice during the offseason. It is debatable whether or not this might also be true of
a land owner under a "custom" doctrine state unless the custom
was so well known and accepted by all as to negate any idea of
exclusive private ownership.
When a private owner is divested of some of his property
rights, or of the property itself, through the application of a
doctrine which establishes that he never really owned what he
thought he purchased, the result is an economic loss to the owner.
This is compounded by a sense of injustice, for the loss is not
compensable unless his grantor, still alive and solvent, could be
held for breach of warranty. Certainly full use and enjoyment are
hampered if not rendered impossible by the presence of
sunworshippers, campers, and trailers using his property.
E.

ALTERNATIVE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS

Existing side by side with possible judicial approaches are the
possibilities of eminent domain 4 and the exercise of police
power.6 5 Eminent domain is considered a taking within the
64. See note 10, supra. The California Constitution provides for the right of eminent
domain over beaches in the same article providing for public access to the beaches. Art.

XV, § 1 provides that the right of eminent domain is declared to exist in the state to all
frontages on the navigable waters of this state.

65. Discussing the difference between police power and eminent domain, the court in
Mid-way Cabinet Fixture v. County of San Joaquin, 257 Cal. App. 2d 181, 186, 65 Cal.

Rptr. 37, 40 (1967) stated:
Theoretically, not superimposed upon but coexisting alongside the power of
eminent domain is the police-power, unwritten except in case law. It has been
variously defined-never to the concordant satisfaction of all courts or legal

scholars-and frequently it has been inconsistently applied by different courts
. . . sometimes, to our belief, by the same court. The police power is described
more readily than it can be defined.
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meaning of the Fifth Amendment and legislatures have been
extremely hesitant in exercising this power-such an obvious,
equitable solution to the public need. Further, and aided by
hindsight, courts have also seemed reluctant to find that a taking
has occurred." This is due in part to the prohibitive expense of
beach property-an inflated valuation symptomatic of the
underlying problem-a small supply in large demand. The value
of beach property will continue to inflate as the demand continues
to increase.
However, the expense of acquisition could be apportioned in
taxes with the result that the public, recipient of the ultimate
benefit, would also share the burden. A plan could be adopted to
acquire the beaches for public use in a piece meal fashion which
would even further minimize the cost. Federal aid is also available
to those states wishing to acquire beach property under the "Open
Spaces" Program.6 7 In this way, private property owners would
receive compensation for their loss and the economic burden
would be shared by the general public.
The state has an inherent power to regulate the use and
enjoyment of private properaty for the promotion of public health,
safety, and welfare.
Governments find their reason for existence and their
justification for continuance in the services which they render
to the health, safety, morals, conservation of resources, and
general welfare of the group governed. It is therefore, not
surprising to find courts repeatedly asserting that property
rights are always held subject to the police power, that is, the
power of the government to do that for which it exists ....
The criterion is whether the restriction "is reasonably in the
interest of the public health, welfare, comfort and morals and
is not arbitrary or discriminatory.
The prevalent view is that police power may be used to
66. "A Court assigned to differentiate among impacts which are and are not 'takings'
is essentially engaged in deciding when the government may execute public programs while
leaving associated costs disproportionately concentrated upon one or a few persons."
Michelman, Property, Utility, & Fairness; Comments on the Ethical Foundation of Just
Compensation Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967).
67. The Federal "Open Spaces" Program provides funds to the States for acquisition
of land with the provision that it will be kept open to the public. See the Open Space Land
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1500 et. seq. (1966).

68.

POWELL

§ 955.
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promote public welfare. It does not necessitate compensation as
does eminent domain, since its exercise is considered a regulation
or a restriction of use and enjoyment rather than a taking.69 If the
legislature could regulate the use and enjoyment of beach property
to the vegetation line, it would eliminate current conflict over the
dry-sand area. This is in effect what the Oregon court has done,
through the exercise of police power. As a private property
owner's use is curtailed by zoning, sanitation, fire and a variety
of other governmental regulations, why a similar regulation of the
dry-sand area would be deemed any greater an infringement upon
private property rights is difficult to conceptualize. The beach
owner in an area zoned against high rise can not make as much
money as those who can build multi-complex apartments but the
power to zone remains even though resulting in economic "loss"
in some cases. A littoral owner could perhaps benefit
economically from a private beach area, but that is no reason to
avoid a use restriction. As in other regulations affecting use and
enjoyment, there is no actual physical acquisition of the land.
One very important legislative development is the emergence
of "stop gap" bills designed to.temporarily halt unplanned use of
the coast until more feasible solutions can be devised.7" Since the
natural beauties of our seashores are a fragile resource, one that
can be easily destroyed but never replaced, this type of a
moratorium on beach use is a wise, though temporary solution.
It is also extremely necessary. Bill No. 4931 introduced into the

California Assembly in February, 1970, prohibits further
unnecessary prevention of public access to the ocean, or bays, by
requiring subdivisions to provide reasonable access from public
highways to land below the ordinary high-water mark. If the
subdivision map shows no provision for such access then no city
or county would be able to approve it. This is the type of
legislation which is needed to protect the rights of the public to
the use of or access over land adjacent to navigable waters.
69. The boundary between the two is vague. For a discussion of eminent domain and
police power, see 20 HASTINGS L. REv. 735 (1969).

70. "Legislation has been introduced which would form a statewide agency to
draw up and implement a plan for the best use of the shoreline. Until the plan

is completed, a moratorium would be placed on further development." L.A.
Times, April 6, 1970, § 2, at 1, col. 4.

71. Introduced by Assemblymen Dunlap, Sieroty, and Z'berg and referred to the
Committee on Local Government.
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F.

CONCLUSION

As the population continues to grow at an unprecedented
rate, other precedents will also be broken. Many private rights will
inevitably give way to public necessity, just as they have in the
past. Courts and legislatures will be called upon to adopt new
approaches to new problems. As examples, the Gion-Dietz
decision represents a willingness to adapt a traditional doctrine to
a different situation; Thorton v. Hay illustrates a willingness to
adopt a doctrine quite unique in this country, in order to establish
the customary rights of the public.
The attempts by private owners, beach clubs, hotels, and even
municipalities, to fence off and keep private certain beach areas
for their own guests and residents to the complete exclusion of all
others, seem abhorent in the face of rapidly growing public
recreational needs. It is estimated that America will be a
completely urbanized nation of 300 million or more in 30 years.7
Hopefully, the beaches devoted to public use will have been greatly
increased by that time. We need the foresight to realize that our
actions must ensure that our city-bound citizens of the future will
have opportunities to enrich their lives. We must be careful not
to condemn our future citizens to a neon-lighted concrete world
in the name of progress:7 3
We need the sea.
We need a place to stand
and watch and listento feel the pulse-beat of the world
as the surf rolls in.
We need to keep some of
our vanishing shoreline an unspoiled place,
72. Udall, Introduction to AMERICA

THE BEAUTIFUL 10 (R. Polley ed. 1964).
73. In an address, John F. Kennedy observed:
Government must provide a national policy framework for this new
conservation emphasis; but in the final analysis, it must be done by the people
themselves. The American people are not by nature wasteful. They are not
unappreciative of our inheritance, but unless we, as a country, with the support
and sometimes the direction of Government, [work] with state leaders, [work]
with the community, [work] with all our citizens, we are going to leave an
entirely different inheritance in the next 25 years than the one we found.
Address, J.F. Kennedy, Pinchot Institute for Conservation Studies, Milford, Pa., Sept. 24,

1963, in

AMERICA THE BEAUTIFUL

at 20 (R. Polley ed. 1964).
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where all men, a few at a time,
can discover what really belongs therecan find their own Island in Time.74
SUSAN P. FINLAY
DAVID J. VANTIL
74. Preface,to H.

GILLIAM, ISLAND IN

TIME (1962).

